United States v. Monostra by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-25-1997 
United States v. Monostra 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"United States v. Monostra" (1997). 1997 Decisions. 229. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/229 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed September 25, 1997 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 








ALFRED MONOSTRA, III, 
       Appellant 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Criminal No. 96-00116) 
 
Argued on July 23, 1997 
 
Before: SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and 
DEBEVOISE, District Judge* 
 
(Opinion filed September 25, 1997) 
 
Anita D. Eve, Esq. (Argued) 
Office of the U.S. Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street 
Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, Pa. 19106 
 






*The Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise, Senior District Judge for the 




       Thomas A. Bergstrom, Esq. 
       (Argued) 
       138 Davis Road 
       Malvern, Pa. 19355 
 
       Counsel for Appellant 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 
Alfred Monostra, III, appeals his conviction on one count 
of bank fraud, arguing that he was indicted under the 
wrong subsection of 18 U.S.C. S 1344. Because we find that 
indictment under subsection (1) of the statute was not 
erroneous, we will affirm the conviction. 
 
Monostra also challenges the addition of two points to the 
calculation of his sentence under U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1, because 
the president of the company he victimized was visually 
impaired. We agree that the district court erred by imposing 
the "vulnerable victim" enhancement, for the reason that 
the record lacks any evidence that the president's visual 
impairment facilitated Monostra's scheme. Consequently, 
we will vacate the sentence. On remand, the district court 
may conduct further factfinding to determine whether the 
company itself was a "vulnerable victim" or if Monostra did, 
in fact, take advantage of Landis' impairment. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
 
Diverse Technical Lines, Inc., is a small, closely-held 
corporation that primarily sells group health insurance 
plans to other small businesses. Diverse Technical Lines 
administers the plans by billing the customers, collecting 
the premiums and forwarding the premiums to the 
insurance providers. Diverse Technical Lines' president, 
David T. Landis, decided that the company needed an 
individual with an accounting background to run the 
finance department, which collected and dispersed the 
premiums. He hired Alfred Monostra, a young man with a 
 




college degree in business administration who claimed to 
have earned a master's degree as well. 
 
Soon after assuming his duties at Diverse Technical 
Lines, Monostra embarked on a scheme to steal money 
from the company. Diverse Technical Lines maintained two 
corporate accounts with Cheltenham Bank and one with 
Core States Financial Corporation.1 Both institutions were 
FDIC insured. Although Landis and company vice-president 
Michael J. Foley were the only individuals with signature 
authority over the bank accounts, the checkbooks were 
kept by the bookkeeper, who sat next to Monostra, and 
Monostra was authorized to prepare some checks for 
signature by Landis and Foley. Between March 1993 and 
September 1994, Monostra wrote fourteen checks on 
Diverse Technical Lines' accounts with Cheltenham and 
Core States for amounts totaling $657,160.69, and forged 
Landis' signature on them. The checks were made out to 
"ABM Enterprises," a fictitious entity, and deposited into 
Monostra's personal bank account at Meridian Bank. 
Monostra avoided detection until September 1994 by 
removing the canceled checks when they returned to 
Diverse Technical Lines, writing "VOID" on the 
corresponding check stubs, and delaying the payment of 
premiums to the insurance providers so that those funds 
would be available to cover the forged checks. When the 
scheme was eventually uncovered by an alert employee in 
the finance department, Monostra confessed to Landis and 
Foley that he had stolen the money, and returned 
$239,000. 
 
A grand jury indicted Monostra on one count of bank 
fraud under 18 U.S.C. S 1344(1) and one count of interstate 
transportation of stolen checks under 18 U.S.C. SS 2 & 
2314. The United States subsequently dropped the second 
charge. Monostra waived his right to a trial by jury. By 
order of June 24, 1996, Monostra was found guilty of bank 
fraud. A motion for judgment of acquittal was denied on the 
same day. 
 
The presentence investigation report calculated a total 
offense level of seventeen, including a two-point 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Core States acquired Cheltenham Bank in June 1994. 
 




enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3 for abusing a position 
of trust, and a two-point reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility. The court corrected a mistake in the 
calculation of amount of money lost, thereby increasing the 
total offense level by one point. The court also added two 
points under U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1, finding that Landis was an 
unusually vulnerable victim because of his visual 
impairment. Monostra was sentenced to thirty-six months' 
imprisonment, five years' supervised release, and he was 
required to make restitution to Diverse Technical Lines in 
the amount of $307,000. 
 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Monostra raises two claims. First, he 
contends that he was improperly indicted under 18 U.S.C. 
S 1344(1). Second, he argues that the record does not 
support the two-point enhancement of his sentence for 
exploiting a vulnerable victim. Both issues were preserved 
below, and we consider each in turn. 
 
A. Bank Fraud 
 
       The federal bank fraud statute states: 
 
       Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a 
       scheme or artifice -- 
 
       (1) to defraud a financial institution; or 
 
       (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, 
       assets, securities, or other property owned by, or 
       under the custody or control of, a financial 
       institution, by means of false or fraudulent 
       pretenses, representations, or promises; 
 
       shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned 
       not more than 30 years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1344. Monostra was indicted and convicted 
under 18 U.S.C. S 1344(1). This was an error, Monostra 
argues, because he never intended to defraud Cheltenham 
or Core States of their money or property. Rather, Monostra 
asserts that he intended to defraud Diverse Technical Lines 
of money it had in its bank accounts, and that the deposits 
 




in those accounts were sufficient to cover the checks he 
forged. If anything, Monostra urges, he is only guilty of 
violating 18 U.S.C. S 1344(2), which prohibits schemes to 
obtain "moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities or other 
property . . . under the custody or control of[ ] a financial 
institution." 
 
Monostra assumes that the two subsections of the 
statute are entirely disjunctive, but analysis of the text as 
well as the legislative history indicates otherwise. For 
instance, both subsections prohibit schemes or artifices 
fraudulently to obtain money or property owned by a 
financial institution, for as the Supreme Court has stated, 
the words "to defraud", used in S 1344(1), "commonly refer 
`to wronging one in his property rights.' " McNally v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 350, 359, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987) 
(quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 
188, 44 S. Ct. 511, 512 (1924)). Similarly, while not every 
scheme to defraud will be accomplished with the aid of 
"false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises," United States v. Schwartz, 899 F.2d 243, 246 
(3d Cir. 1990), as prohibited by S 1344(2), the use of such 
devices may certainly constitute a scheme to defraud under 
S 1344(1) as well, since fraud is a broad concept that "is 
measured in a particular case by determining whether the 
scheme demonstrated a departure from fundamental 
honesty, moral uprightness, or fair play and candid 
dealings in the general life of the community," United States 
v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 624 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
The legislative history of the statute also indicates that 
subsection (2) may be regarded in part as a clarification of 
subsection (1). The authors of the bank fraud statute 
modeled it after the wire and mail fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. 
SS 1341 & 1343. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 378 (1983), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3519. As the 
Judiciary Committee noted, "Like these existing fraud 
statutes, the proposed bank fraud offense proscribes the 
conduct of executing or attempting to execute `a scheme or 
artifice to defraud' or to take the property of another `by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises.' " Id.; cf. 18 U.S.C. S 1341 ("Whoever, having 
devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
 




defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises 
. . . ."); 18 U.S.C. S 1343 (same). Since the bank fraud 
statute drew important phrasing from the mail and wire 
fraud statutes, the history of the latter statutes is relevant 
to interpreting the act before us. 
 
In McNally v. United States, the Supreme Court 
scrutinized the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. S 1341. It 
noted that as first enacted in 1872, the mail fraud statute 
merely contained a general proscription against "any 
scheme or artifice to defraud." 483 U.S. at 356, 107 S. Ct. 
at 2879. Then, in 1909, Congress amended the statute by 
adding the phrase "or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises" after the original phrase "any scheme or artifice 
to defraud." Id. at 357, 107 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing Act of 
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, S 215, 35 Stat. 1130). The McNally 
court concluded that the second phrase was a codification 
of intervening Supreme Court precedent2  added "simply [to 
make] it unmistakable that the statute reached false 
promises and misrepresentations as to the future as well as 
other frauds involving money or property." Id. at 359, 107 
S. Ct. at 2881. Thus, when Congress copied the 
phraseology of the mail and wire fraud statutes into the 
bank fraud statute, it adopted two provisions that never 
were intended to be mutually exclusive. 
 
Nevertheless, Congress did not adopt the wording of the 
mail and wire fraud statutes in their entirety. Specifically, 
the mail and wire fraud statutes do not penalize the 
victimization of specific persons; rather, they are directed at 
the instrumentalities of fraud. In contrast, the bank fraud 
statute was expressly "designed to provide an effective 
vehicle for the prosecution of frauds in which the victims 
are financial institutions that are federally created, 
controlled or insured." S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 377, 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3517. The two subsections of the statute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Specifically, the case of Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 16 
S. Ct. 508 (1896) (holding the statute must be read to include 
"everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or 
present, or suggestions or promises as to the future"). 
 




express this in different terms: S 1344(1) prohibits schemes 
"to defraud a financial institution," while S 1344(2) prohibits 
schemes to obtain money or property "owned by, or under 
the custody or control of, a financial institution." The 
"custody or control" language is not taken from the mail or 
wire fraud statutes. Monostra would have us readS 1344(1) 
to pertain exclusively to money or property owned by a 
financial institution, and read S 1344(2) more expansively to 
include as well money and property merely in the custody 
and control of the financial institution. 
 
Monostra's interpretation is not implausible. However, 
consideration of the bank fraud statute's legislative history 
suggests that, in this instance, too, subsection (2) may have 
been intended to clarify the scope of S 1344. The Judiciary 
Committee report does not explain why the statute contains 
two subsections or the differences between them. S. Rep. 
No. 98-225, at 377-79, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3517-19. 
Instead, the report focusses exclusively on the need for a 
federal statute proscribing bank fraud generally. Id. 
Previously, such crimes had been federally prosecuted 
under statutes proscribing mail or wire fraud, larceny or 
false statement. Id. at 377, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3517-18 
(citing 18 U.S.C. SS 1014, 1341, 1343, 2113). However, the 
utility of these statutes had been judicially circumscribed, 
creating "serious gaps" in federal jurisdiction over frauds 
against financial institutions. Id. Given Congress' aim of 
creating a statute that would empower federal prosecutors 
to pursue all forms of bank fraud, it is evident that 
S 1344(2) was mainly intended to underscore the breadth of 
the statute's reach. 
 
Even assuming that Monostra is correct that the phrase 
"to defraud a financial institution" does not encompass 
schemes to obtain money or property that are merely in a 
financial institution's custody or control, Monostra 
misconstrues banking law when he argues that the money 
he stole was his employer's property in the custody of 
Cheltenham and Core States. It is a fundamental principle 
of banking law that money deposited with a bank becomes 
the bank's property. United States v. Henry, 29 F.3d 112, 
114 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing, inter alia, In re Prudential Trust 
Co.'s Assignment, 72 A. 798, 799 (Pa. 1909)). When Diverse 
 




Technical Lines deposited funds in its accounts with 
Cheltenham and Core States, those banks did not become 
the custodians of that money; rather, Diverse Technical 
Lines became a creditor of Cheltenham and Core States in 
the amount of the deposits. See In re Prudential Trust Co.'s 
Assignment, 72 A. at 799; Triffin v. Interstate Printing Co., 
515 A.2d 956, 958 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). By depositing 
forged checks into his personal bank account, Monostra 
triggered a transfer of assets that were the property of 
Cheltenham and Core States. In the most direct sense, 
Monostra was defrauding these banks of money and 
property. 
 
The fact that Core States3 may succeed in passing the 
loss on to Diverse Technical Lines, by subtracting the 
stolen amounts from its debt to the company, is not 
dispositive. As we have noted in the past, the government 
need not show that the banks actually incurred a loss in 
order to prove a scheme or artifice to defraud. Goldblatt, 
813 F.2d at 624 (citations omitted). Exposure to potential 
loss is sufficient. In this instance, Monostra not only 
deprived the banks of their property by forging checks, but 
as the district court noted, the banks may ultimately bear 
the liability for the loss under 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 
3420, if Diverse Technical Lines can show that the banks 
did not exercise ordinary care in paying the checks under 
13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 3405(b). The record in this case 
indicates that Diverse Technical Lines has, in fact, brought 
suit against Core States for honoring the forged checks. 
 
In summary, we hold that Monostra was correctly 
indicted and convicted under 18 U.S.C. S 1344(1) because 
he defrauded Cheltenham and Core States of their property 
by depositing forged checks into his personal bank account 
at Meridian, thereby causing a transfer of property owned 
by Cheltenham and Core States to Meridian. 
 
B. Vulnerable Victim Enhancement 
 
Monostra argues that the district court erred in adding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As noted supra, Core States has purchased Cheltenham and so 
succeeded to its interests. 




two points to his sentence for exploiting a vulnerable victim 
under U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1(b), at least insofar as the 
enhancement was based on the visual impairment of 
Diverse Technical Lines president Landis, because the 
record lacks evidence that Landis' impairment contributed 
to the success of Monostra's scheme. We agree. 
 
This appeal presents questions of law and fact. On 
review, the trial court's findings of fact are measured by the 
clearly erroneous standard, while we give plenary 
consideration to the court's construction of the guidelines. 
United States v. Hillstrom, 988 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
Monostra concedes that it is not entirely clear why the 
district court applied the vulnerable victim enhancement. 
At the sentencing hearing, the government argued that the 
enhancement should be given because Monostra had 
exploited a small and vulnerable company that nearly went 
under because it was not insured against the loss Monostra 
caused. Portions of the record suggest that the district 
court rejected this argument. In particular, the court said, 
 
       [W]hile this is a small business, I don't know of 
       businesses who stay in business who can't afford the 
       insurance. That is an expense just like heat, light and 
       other things and there were no safeguards in there. I 
       am not so much impressed with that . . . . It's like a 
       small taxi cab running around without liability 
       insurance. Either park the car or get the insurance. 
       That's my view. 
 
On the other hand, when announcing that the vulnerable 
victim provision would be applied, the court noted that 
"your co[mp]troller is . . . very trusted, usually the top 
financial person in a small business." Therefore, the court 
may have found the enhancement was appropriate because 
Diverse Technical Lines' size made it particularly 
vulnerable. In light of this uncertainty, we will remand the 
matter to the district court for further factfinding on the 
issue of whether Diverse Technical Lines was particularly 
susceptible to Monostra's criminal conduct, or rendered 
susceptible by Landis' visual impairment. We now append 
a few comments on the applicability of S 3A1.1 when the 
 




vulnerable victim is an institution or business entity rather 
than a natural person. 
 
The sole charge on which Monostra was tried and 
convicted was the bank fraud count discussed supra. 
Consequently, Diverse Technical Lines was not the victim of 
the offense of conviction. However, in United States v. Cruz, 
106 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (3d Cir. 1997), we held that the 
drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines did not intend to limit 
the application of S 3A1.1(b) to situations in which the 
vulnerable person was the victim of the offense of 
conviction. Rather, trial courts may look to all the conduct 
underlying an offense, using S 1B1.3 as a guide. Id. at 
1137. 
 
This case differs from the usual case where a third 
party's vulnerability has been exploited. In all of the 
instances cited by the government, the victim of the offense 
of conviction was an agency or business, while the 
vulnerable victim was a natural person. United States v. 
Haggard, 41 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (imprisoned felon 
who victimized family of missing child by claiming to know 
the child's whereabouts convicted of perjury and 
obstruction of justice); United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 
175 (2d Cir. 1994) (insurers defrauded by individual who 
posed as a medical doctor and treated patients); United 
States v. Lee, 973 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1992) (sentence of 
bank employee convicted of embezzlement could have been 
enhanced if evidence showed that the customers whose 
checks she stole were particularly vulnerable); United States 
v. Yount, 960 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1992) (sentence of bank 
vice-president could be enhanced for exploiting 
incapacitated individuals although the bank had 
reimbursed them); United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F.2d 
722 (5th Cir. 1991) (insurers and government defrauded by 
physician who submitted false claims); United States v. 
Callaway, 943 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1991) (Social Security 
Administration defrauded of benefits by representative 
payee for disabled infant). Similarly, the commentary to 
S 3A1.1(b) only provides examples of vulnerable victims who 
are natural persons. U.S.S.G. S 3A1.1 application note 2 
(1995) ("The adjustment would apply, for example, in a 
fraud case where the defendant marketed an ineffective 
 




cancer cure or in a robbery where the defendant selected a 
handicapped victim."). 
 
Nevertheless, the Sentencing Guidelines do not preclude 
the application of the vulnerable victim enhancement in 
instances when the victim was an entity rather than a 
natural person. The text of S 3A1.1(b) allows the 
enhancement "[i]f the defendant knew or should have 
known that a victim of the offense was unusually 
vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that 
a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the 
criminal conduct." While the first clause refers to the 
characteristics of natural persons, the second clause can 
encompass a broader range of circumstances, including 
those pertinent to business organizations. 
 
In our recent Cruz decision, we declared that the purpose 
of the vulnerable victim enhancement is "to acknowledge 
that, while most crimes are committed for other motives, in 
many instances defendants know or should know of their 
victim's particular vulnerability and are therefore more 
blameworthy for knowingly or even negligently harming 
them." 106 F.3d at 1139. A defendant is no less 
blameworthy for having expressed his evil intentions by 
exploiting the particular vulnerabilities of a small business, 
than another would be for having exploited the 
vulnerabilities of a natural person. For this reason, courts 
may apply S 3A1.1(b) in instances where the defendant has 
exploited the particular susceptibility of a business or 
entity. We express no opinion on the applicability of S 3A1.1 
in this instance, but leave that to the discretion of the 
district court on remand. 
 
We now turn to a fact on which the district court clearly 
did rely in applying the vulnerable victim enhancement: 
Landis' visual impairment. At the sentencing hearing, the 
district judge said that while he was not so impressed by 
Diverse Technical Lines' lack of insurance, 
 
       I am impressed with the idea that this person comes in 
       as co[mp]troller and he says he has a master's degree 
       which . . . he does not have and the person for whom 
       he works and who has direct responsibility that flows 
       to him is blind . . . . I am impressed with stealing from 
 




       a blind man. I think most people think that's a little bit 
       worse than stealing from [a] person who is physically 
       able. 
 
On appeal, Monostra argues that the district court erred 
both in finding that Landis was "blind" and in applying the 
enhancement when there was no showing that Landis' 
alleged impairment contributed to the success of 
Monostra's scheme to defraud. 
 
Although the record contains scant evidence on the 
extent of Landis' impairment, we are satisfied that the 
district court did not clearly err in finding that Landis was 
"blind." The court had two opportunities to observe Landis: 
when he testified at trial and at the sentencing hearing. 
Although Landis had enough visual capacity to testify at 
trial that his signature had been forged on the checks 
entered into evidence, he needed to use a pen light to view 
the checks. Having observed this and Landis' demeanor 
generally, the court was in the best position to determine 
whether Landis was so impaired that he might be 
particularly susceptible to Monostra's criminal conduct. 
 
Monostra argues that even if Landis had impaired vision, 
the vulnerable victim enhancement may not be applied 
absent a showing that Monostra targeted Landis or that 
Landis' impairment contributed to the success of 
Monostra's scheme. Monostra is correct that there is no 
evidence that he targeted Diverse Technical Lines because 
of Landis' poor vision. However, as we recently held in Cruz, 
S 3A1.1 does not require that the defendant consciously 
have targeted the victim because of the latter's vulnerability 
or susceptibility. 106 F.3d at 1137, 1139. The 
enhancement may be applied when the defendant knew or 
should have known of the victim's susceptibility. Id. at 
1139. Monostra worked in close proximity to Landis and 
certainly should have known of Landis' visual impairment. 
 
Nevertheless, we agree that the enhancement may not be 
applied absent a showing that the victim's vulnerability or 
susceptibility facilitated the defendant's crime in some 
manner. Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary (1988) 
defines the word "susceptible" as "open, subject or 
unresistant to some stimulus, influence or agency." The 
 




word "vulnerable" is defined as "open to attack or damage." 
Id. Both definitions imply that the weakness of the object 
contributes to the successful operation of the subject. 
Thus, the use of the words "susceptible" and"vulnerable" in 
S 3A1.1 indicates that the enhancement is to be applied 
when the defendant has taken advantage of the victim's 
weakness. 
 
This understanding is implicit in our previous 
discussions of S 3A1.1. For instance, in United States v. 
Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418 (3d Cir. 1992), we affirmed the 
application of the enhancement, finding that "the 
defendant's consumer fraud scheme depended in many 
instances on the inability of elderly homeowners to verify 
the need to repair or replace [their] roofs," id. at 1426. 
Similarly, in United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 
1054-55 (3d Cir. 1991), we affirmed the district court's 
finding that two of the victims were particularly susceptible 
to the defendant's persistent requests for funds because 
they were the parents of the defendant's girlfriend, whom 
he entirely supported. In Cruz, the defendant accomplished 
a carjacking by placing a semi-automatic gun to the head 
of a twelve-year-old passenger. 106 F.3d at 1135. 
 
Cases outside this circuit which the government has 
cited in arguing that S 3A1.1 may be applied when the 
vulnerable person was not the victim of the offense of 
conviction likewise underscore the need for a showing that 
the criminal conduct exploited the victim's particular 
vulnerability or susceptibility. The case most directly on 
point is Lee. There the court found that the application of 
S 3A1.1 was clearly erroneous where there was little 
particularized evidence that the elderly customers whose 
deposits were embezzled had been rendered unusually 
vulnerable by their age: the probation officer who testified 
at the hearing was unable to provide any evidence that the 
customers were physically or mentally impaired due to their 
age. 973 F.2d at 834-35. The court of appeals concluded 
that "there should be a nexus between the victim's 
vulnerability and the crime's ultimate success" before 
S 3A1.1 may be applied. Id. at 834 (citing United States v. 
Moree, 897 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
 




The Lee court contrasted its facts with those of the Yount 
case in the Eleventh Circuit. There, the court found that 
the customers were very old, infirm and incapable of 
managing their own financial affairs, 960 F.2d at 957, 
which increased the chances that the defendant's thefts 
from their trust funds would not be detected, see id. at 
958. 
 
Both the Second and Fifth Circuits have had occasion to 
consider cases of insurance fraud. In Echevarria , the 
defendant posed as a physician, treated patients and 
submitted claims to insurers. 33 F.3d at 180. In 
Bachynsky, a physician submitted false diagnoses to 
insurance companies and the Department of Defense in 
order to obtain payment for treatment of conditions not 
covered by the patients' policies. 949 F.2d at 735. The 
courts in both instances found that the defendants had 
exploited their patients' need for treatment to carry out 
their frauds. 33 F.3d at 180-81; 949 F.2d at 735. 
 
In all of these cases, the defendant took advantage of the 
victim's vulnerability to carry out the criminal scheme. The 
enhancement is applied not because the victim draws 
sympathy from us because of the infirmity, and we simply 
wish to express extra odium for the act. It is also because 
the infirmity rendered the victim susceptible to the crime 
committed upon him. Regardless of whether the defendant 
deliberately targeted the victims for their vulnerability, that 
vulnerability must to some degree contribute to the success 
of the defendant's scheme. 
 
By contrast, the record here is devoid of evidence 
suggesting that Landis' visual impairment facilitated 
Monostra's scheme to defraud the banks and Diverse 
Technical Lines. First, it is uncontroverted that Monostra 
did not present the stolen checks to Landis for signature, in 
the hope that Landis would not know what he was signing. 
All the evidence suggests that Monostra simply signed 
Landis' name without authorization. Second, there is no 
indication in the record that Landis reviewed Diverse 
Technical Lines' canceled checks or financial records, or 
that Landis would have done so if not for his impairment. 
Diverse Technical Lines vice-president Foley testified that 
he was well acquainted with Landis' signature, yet the 
 




company did not have Foley review the canceled checks or 
other financial records. Consequently, it does not appear 
that Landis' impairment enabled Monostra to escape 
detection longer than he otherwise would have. 
 
Third, in imposing the enhancement, the district court 
commented on the fact that Monostra had lied about 
having earned a master's degree in business 
administration. Here, too, the evidence is lacking that the 
lie went undiscovered because of Landis' visual impairment. 
In fact, Landis testified that he had a private investigator 
look into Monostra's background before Monostra was 
hired. Monostra's lie succeeded because the private 
investigator slipped up. It is doubtful that Landis could 
have determined that the resume contained false 
information if he had 20/20 vision. Moreover, Foley, who 
did not have a visual impairment, testified that he assisted 
Landis with the interviews and could presumably have 
compensated for any problems Landis experienced due to 
his vision. 
 
Finally, the record does not indicate that Diverse 
Technical Lines hired Monostra because of Landis' 
impairment. Landis testified that he had decided to hire 
Monostra because he wanted someone with an accounting 
background to run the company's finance department. The 
record does not suggest that Landis would have run the 
finance department if not for his impairment. 
 Thus, a review of the evidence adduced at trial and the 
sentencing hearing indicates that Monostra did not target 
Diverse Technical Lines due to Landis' impairment, nor did 
the impairment facilitate Monostra's scheme in any respect. 
Enhancement of the sentence is only appropriate where a 
victim was "particularly susceptible" to the crime that 
occurred. There is nothing in this record to suggest that 
Landis' visual impairment made him or Diverse Technical 
Lines particularly susceptible to Monostra's embezzling. 
Consequently, the district court clearly erred to the extent 
it imposed the two-point enhancement under S 3A1.1 on 




We will affirm Monostra's conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 
1344(1), but vacate his sentence and remand for 
 




resentencing. The district court may consider any evidence 
bearing on the particular susceptibility of Diverse Technical 
Lines when determining whether to reimpose the vulnerable 
victim enhancement. It may also consider any further 
evidence the government may have which would show that 
Landis' visual impairment did, in fact render Diverse 
susceptible, or otherwise facilitate Monostra's crime. 
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